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Abstract
We propose Oblivious Attribute Certiﬁcates (OACerts), an attribute certiﬁcate scheme in which a certiﬁ-
cate holder can select which attributes to use and how to use them. In particular, a user can use attribute values
stored in an OACert obliviously, i.e., the user obtains a service if and only if the attribute values satisfy the
policy of the service provider, yet the service provider learns nothing about these attribute values.
To build OACerts, we propose a new cryptographic primitive called Oblivious Commitment Based Enve-
lope (OCBE). In an OCBE scheme, Bob has an attribute value committed to Alice and Alice runs a protocol
with Bob to send an envelope (encrypted message) to Bob such that: (1) Bob can open the envelope if and only
if his committed attribute value satisﬁes a predicate chosen by Alice. (2) Alice learns nothing about Bob’s at-
tribute value. We develop provably secure and efﬁcient OCBE protocols for the Pedersen commitment scheme
and predicates such as =,≥,≤,>,<,6= as well as logical combinations of them.
1 Introduction
Access control presents difﬁcult problems in open distributed environments such as the Internet, particularly
when resources and requesters belong to different security domains controlled by different authorities. Many
commonly used access control mechanisms make access decisions based on the identity of the requester. How-
ever, when the resource owner and the requester are unknown to each other, access control based on the re-
quester’s identity may be ineffective. An alternative is to grant resources based on the characteristics of the
requester that may be more relevant than his identity, such as age, employer, credit status, or security clearance.
We call this approach attribute-based access control (ABAC) [20, 10, 29, 28, 41]. In ABAC systems, access deci-
sions are based on attributes of the requester, which are established by digitally signed certiﬁcates through which
certiﬁcate issuers assert their judgements about the attributes of entities. Each certiﬁcate associates a public key
with the key holder’s identity and/or attributes such as employer, group membership, credit card information,
birth-date, citizenship, and so on. Because these certiﬁcates are digitally signed, they can serve to introduce
strangers to one another without online contact with the attribute authorities.
Privacy is an important concern in the use of Internet and web services. When the attribute information
in a certiﬁcate is sensitive, the certiﬁcate holder may want to disclose only the information that is absolutely
necessary to obtain services. For example, a digital driver license may have ﬁelds for an identiﬁcation number,
expiration date, name, address, date of birth, etc. Often times, only partial information of some attributes needs
to be revealed to obtain a service. Consider the following scenario: a senior citizen Bob requests from a service
provider a document that can be accessed freely by senior citizens. Bob wants to use his digital driver license
to prove that he is entitled to free access. What is the minimal amount of information Bob has to reveal to get
free access? It might seem that Bob needs to reveal at least the fact that he is a senior citizen. However, even
this seemingly minimal amount of information disclosure can be avoided. Suppose the document is encrypted
under a key and the encrypted document is freely available to everyone. Further suppose a protocol exists such
that after the protocol is executed between the service provider and Bob, Bob obtains the key if and only if the
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provider learns nothing about Bob’s birth-date. Under these conditions, the service provider can perform access
control based on Bob’s attribute values while protecting Bob’s attribute information.
In 2003, three groups of researchers independently proposed schemes that can use a certiﬁcate in an oblivious
fashion similar to the way described above. These schemes are Oblivious Signature Based Envelope [27], Hidden
Credentials [25], and Secret Handshakes [1]. In these schemes, a service provider does not learn whether a user
has a certiﬁcate or not. However, all these schemes require the service provider to know the content of the
requester’s certiﬁcate (which includes the attribute values), either by guessing or by having the requester send the
content while withholding the signature. The service provider does not know whether the user has a signature on
the content or not. This is acceptable for attributes that have binary values, i.e., one either has the attribute (e.g.,
a secret clearance) or does not have it. These schemes do not work well when an attribute (e.g., birth-date) can
take many values and the access policy is a predicate on the attribute value. Some of these schemes also have
other limitations. We discuss these schemes and their limitations in more details in Section 2.
In this paper we propose Oblivious Attribute Certiﬁcates (OACerts), a scheme for using certiﬁcates to doc-
ument sensitive attributes. Using OACerts, a user can select which attributes to use as well as how to use them.
An attribute can be used through one of the following three methods.
1. A user sends the attribute value to the service provider, revealing the attribute information completely.
2. A user proves in a zero-knowledge fashion that the attribute value satisﬁes the policy set by the service
provider without revealing the actual attribute value. The service provider learns only that the attribute
value satisﬁes the policy and nothing else.
3. A user can use the attribute value obliviously, i.e., the user runs a protocol with the service provider such
that the user obtains the service if and only if the attribute value satisﬁes the policy set by the service
provider, yet the service provider learns nothing about the attribute value, not even whether the value
satisﬁes the policy.
The cryptographic tools that we use in building OACerts are commitment schemes, zero-knowledge proof of
assertions about committed values, and Oblivious Commitment Based Envelope (OCBE). The ﬁrst two exist in
literature [32, 14, 12, 21, 17, 31, 19]; OCBE is a novel cryptographic primitive introduced in this paper.
Informally, a commitment scheme enables a prover to commit a value to a veriﬁer such that the veriﬁer
does not know which value has been committed, and the prover cannot change its mind after having committed.
We use commit to denote the commitment algorithm of a commitment scheme. To be secure, a commitment
scheme cannot be deterministic; thus a commitment of a value a also depends on a secret random value r. We
use c = commit(a,r) to denote a commitment of a. For some commitment schemes, zero-knowledge proof
protocols exist to prove that the committed value satisﬁes some properties.
The basic idea of OACerts is quite simple. Instead of storing attribute values directly in the certiﬁcates, we
store the commitments of these values in the certiﬁcates. OACerts can be easily integrated into current standards
for public-key certiﬁcates such as X.509 [3, 26]. For example, the commitments can be stored in X.509v3
extension ﬁelds. The distribution and revocation of OACerts can be handled using existing infrastructure and
techniques.
The ﬁrst two methods of disclosing attribute values can be achieved using existing techniques. However, to
allow the third (oblivious) method of using attributes, we need to solve the following 2-party Secure Function
Evaluation (SFE) problem:
Problem 1 Let commit be a commitment algorithm, let a be a private number (Bob’s attribute value), and let
c = commit(a,r) be a commitment of a with secret random r. Let Pred be a predicate, and M be a private
message (Alice wants Bob to see M if and only if a satisﬁes Pred). Alice and Bob want to compute a family F
of functions, parameterized by commit and Pred. Both parties have commit, Pred, and c. Alice has private input
M. Bob has private input a and r. The function F is deﬁned as follows.
2F[commit,Pred]Alice(c,M,a,r) = 0
F[commit,Pred]Bob(c,M,a,r) = {
M if c = commit(a,r) ∧ Pred(a) = true;
0 otherwise.
where F[commit,Pred]Alice represents Alice’s output, F[commit,Pred]Bob represents Bob’s output. In other
words, our goal is that Alice learns nothing (as Alice sees a constant 0) and Bob learns M only when his com-
mitted attribute value satisﬁes the predicate Pred.
The SFE problem can be solved using general solutions to 2-party SFE [44, 22]; however, the general solu-
tions are inefﬁcient. We propose an OCBE scheme that solves the above 2-party SFE problem efﬁciently. Formal
deﬁnition of OCBE is given in Section 5.1. Informally, an OCBE scheme enables a sender Alice to send an
envelope (encrypted message) to a receiver Bob, and has the following properties: Bob can open the envelope
if and only if his committed value satisﬁes the predicate. An OCBE scheme is secure against the receiver if a
receiver whose committed value does not satisfy the predicate cannot open the envelope. An OCBE scheme is
oblivious if at the end of the protocol the sender cannot tell whether the receiver’s committed value satisﬁes the
predicate or not.
We develop OCBE protocols for the Pedersen commitment scheme [32] and six kinds of comparison predi-
cates: =,6=,<,>,≤,≥. Each comparison predicate Pred has a parameter a0 and an input a; for example, when
Pred is ≥a0, Pred(a) is true if a ≥ a0. These predicates seem to be the most useful ones for testing attribute
values in access control policies. We present a protocol EQ-OCBE for equality predicates and two protocols GE-
OCBE and GE-OCBE2 for greater-than-or-equal-to predicates and show that these protocols are provably secure
in the random oracle model [2]. We also show that it is easy to construct OCBE protocols for other comparison
predicates using variants of EQ-OCBE, GE-OCBE, GE-OCBE2 as well as for conjunctions and disjunctions of
multiple predicates. Designing OCBE protocols for more sophisticated predicates such as testing whether a com-
mitted number is a prime, or whether several committed values satisfy some linear relation, is beyond the scope
of this paper. We also implemented EQ-OCBE, GE-OCBE, and GE-OCBE2 in Java and tested their performance.
The contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We introduce the OACerts scheme, which overcomes some limitations of previous schemes to use certiﬁed
attributes in an oblivious fashion.
• We introduce OCBE, a cryptographic primitive that enables OACerts. OCBE may be of independent
interest in other applications as well.
• We present efﬁcient and provably secure OCBE protocols for the Pedersen commitment scheme [32] and
several kinds of comparison predicates.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin with discussion of related work in Section 2. In
Section 3, we present the architecture of OACerts and discuss the applications of OACerts. We then review the
Pedersen commitment scheme and two associated zero-knowledge proof protocols in Section 4. In Section 5,
we present a formal deﬁnition of OCBE and several OCBE protocols. We describe our implementation and
performance measurements in Section 6. We conclude our paper in Section 7. An appendix includes proofs for
all theorems in the paper.
2 Related Work
The notion of OCBE is closely related to the notion of Oblivious Signature-Based Envelope (OSBE) introduced
by Li et al. [27]. In OSBE, the content of a certiﬁcate is assumed to be non-sensitive (as anyone can come up
with it) and only the signature is considered to be sensitive (as only the CA can generate the signature). Bob
sends to Alice the content of his certiﬁcate or a certiﬁcate he would have if he has the attribute, and Alice runs
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only if he has the signature on the content he sent earlier. Li et al. [27] developed an OSBE protocol for RSA
signatures [36] and gave a general construction for any signature scheme corresponding to an Identity-Based
public-key Encryption (IBE) scheme [39]. Based on the general construction, they gave OSBE protocols for
BLS signatures [5], which correspond to the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [4], and for Rabin signatures [33],
which correspond to the Cocks IBE scheme [11].
To use OSBE, Bob has to send to Alice the content of a certiﬁcate he has or would have. This works ﬁne when
the certiﬁcate proves that Bob has an attribute that is binary, e.g., Bob has top secret clearance or is a member of
an organization. However, when Bob wants to use his birth-date information in an oblivious fashion, OSBE does
not work well, as the certiﬁcate content contains Bob’s birth-date in clear. To use OSBE for this purpose, Bob
has to run many OSBE protocols with Alice using different dates as his birth-date, hiding his actual birth-date
“in the crowd”. This is very inefﬁcient.
Holtetal.[25]proposedaHiddenCredentialssystemtoprotectsensitiveattributes. Thebasicideaunderlying
Hidden Credentials is that the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [4] gives rise to an OSBE scheme (although it was
not called OSBE in [25]) for the BLS signatures [5]. Holt et al. [25] also observed that when a signature scheme
derived from an IBE scheme is used to sign a certiﬁcate, then the certiﬁcate content can be used as a public
encryption key such that the signature is the corresponding decryption key. Assuming the content of a Hidden
Credential can be guessed, one can start communication by sending an encrypted message such that the other
party can derive the message only when using the correct credential to decrypt. (The receiver may have to try all
credentials it has in order to see which one can decrypt the encrypted message.)
Hidden Credentials can be used only when the content of credentials can be guessed. When a credential
contains a validity period and/or a serial number, as all existing public-key certiﬁcate standards mandate, guess-
ing the content becomes very difﬁcult (if not impossible). Therefore, the Hidden Credentials scheme cannot
work with existing security standards. Furthermore, similar to OSBE, Hidden Credentials cannot be used when
attributes may take many values, such as the birth-date attribute.
Balfanz et al. [1] proposed a construct called Secret Handshakes using pairings that are also the foundation of
the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [4] and the corresponding BLS signatures [5]. The Secret Handshakes scheme
uses the pairing-based key-agreement protocol by Sakai et al. [37]. In Secret Handshakes, each party receives a
credential from a central authority; the credential consists of a pseudonym and a corresponding secret, which can
be viewed as a signature of the pseudonym together with an attribute string, signed using the central authority’s
master secret. The possession of the credential proves that one has the attribute documented in the attribute string.
When Alice and Bob meet, they exchange the pseudonyms and each computes a key based on their own secret,
and the other party’s pseudonym and attribute string. The keys they compute agree only when they both have the
correct credentials.
Similar to OSBE and Hidden Credentials, the Secret Handshakes scheme also requires one party to know the
other party’s attribute string in order to use the secret value in an oblivious way. Furthermore, unlike OSBE and
Hidden Credentials, the Secret Handshakes scheme requires Alice and Bob to use credentials issued by the same
authority; this further limits its applicability.
Our work is also closely related to anonymous credentials [9, 6, 30, 8, 7]. Indeed, the ideas of storing com-
mitments of attribute values in certiﬁcates and using zero-knowledge proofs to prove properties of these values
appeared in the literature on anonymous credentials, e.g. [6]. These schemes differ from OACerts in that they
provide orthogonal privacy protections. None of the existing anonymous credential schemes has the oblivious
usage feature the OACerts scheme has. Using anonymous credentials, Alice still learns whether Bob’s attribute
satisﬁes her policies. On the other hand, anonymous credentials enable Bob to use a credential anonymously, i.e.,
Alice and other service providers cannot link together transactions in which Bob’s credential is used. For such
protection to make sense, anonymous communication channels are required. Otherwise, one can link transactions
together using information such as the IP address of the user. While several protocols for anonymous communi-
cations have been proposed [34, 40], none is widely adopted. On the other hand, the OACerts scheme does not
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credential schemes tend to involve protocols dramatically different from existing public-key infrastructure stan-
dards, e.g., the anonymous credential system in Camenisch et al. [8, 7]. It is not clear how credential distribution
and revocation are to be handled in these systems. On the other hand, the OACerts scheme is compatible with
existing standards.
Both the anonymity property of anonymous credentials and the oblivious property of OACerts are limited to
transactions where services can be delivered in digital form. When services have to delivered physically, e.g.,
a product needs to be shipped to a physical address, such high levels of privacy protection are not possible. In
anonymous credentials, the shipping address can be used to link transactions together. In OACerts, the service
provider Alice knows whether Bob satisﬁes her policies or not as she needs to know whether to ship the product
or not. Observe that in this case, both schemes still offer a higher level of privacy protection than standard
certiﬁcates, as one can prove that an attribute satisﬁes a property without revealing any other information.
Crescenzo et al. [15] introduced a variant of Oblivious Transfer called Conditional Oblivious Transfer, in
which Alice and Bob each has a private input and shares with each other a public predicate that is evaluated
over the private inputs. In the conditional oblivious transfer of a bit b from Alice to Bob, Bob receives the
bit only when the predicate holds; furthermore, Alice learns nothing about Bob’s private input or the output of
the predicate. Crescenzo et al. [15] developed an efﬁcient protocol for a special case of Conditional Oblivious
Transfer where the predicate is greater-than-or-equal-to (≥). OCBE can be viewed as another special case of the
Conditional Oblivious Transfer problem; however, the solutions in [15] do not apply. In OCBE, Alice’s input is
a commitment, the predicate is that Bob’s input must be the value he committed in Alice’s input and furthermore
Bob’s input must satisfy some property (e.g., greater than a certain value). The additional requirement about the
commitments makes our protocols quite different from the ones in [15].
3 Architecture and Applications of OACerts
In this section, we present the architecture of OACerts and discuss the applications of OACerts.
3.1 Architecture of OACerts
There are three kinds of parties in the OACerts scheme: certiﬁcate authorities (CA’s), certiﬁcate holders, and
service providers. A CA issues OACerts for certiﬁcate holders. Each CA and each certiﬁcate holder has a unique
public-private key pair. A service provider, when providing services to a certiﬁcate holder, performs access
control based on the attributes of the certiﬁcate holder. One entity may serve as a CA, a certiﬁcate holder, or a
service provider in different settings.
An OACert is a digitally signed assertion about the certiﬁcate holder by a CA. Each OACert contains one
or more attributes. We use attr1,...,attrm to denote the m attribute names in an OACert, and v1,...,vm to
denote the corresponding m attribute values. Let ci = commit(vi,ri) be the commitment of attribute value vi for
1 ≤ i ≤ m with ri being the secret random. The attribute part of the certiﬁcate consists of a list of m entries, each
entry is an pair (attri,ci). When the commitment scheme used is secure, the certiﬁcate itself does not leak any
information about the sensitive attributes. Thus, an OACert’s content can be made public. A certiﬁcate holder
can show his OACerts to others without worrying about the secrecy of his attributes.
OACerts can be implemented on existing public-key infrastructure standards, such as X.509 [3, 26]. The
commitments can be stored in X.509v3 extension ﬁelds, in which case a certiﬁcate also includes the following
ﬁelds: serial number, validity period, issuer name, user name, certiﬁcate holder’s public key, and so on.
There are four basic protocols in the OACerts scheme:
• CA Initialization: A CA picks up a signature scheme Sig with a public-private key pair (KCA,K−1
CA). The
CA also picks a commitment scheme commit with public parameters CP. The public parameters of the
5CA are {Sig,KCA,commit,CP}. This is different from tradition PKI systems where the public parameters
have only {Sig,KCA}.
• Issue Certiﬁcate: A CA uses this protocol to issue an OACert to a user. A user Bob sends his pub-
lic key KB and attributes information (attr1,v1),...,(attrm,vm) to the CA. After the CA veriﬁes the
correctness of v1,...,vm (using physical methods), it issues an OACert for Bob. In this process, it com-
putes ci = commit(vi,ri) and sends the certiﬁcate along with the secrets r1,...,rm to Bob. Bob keeps
(v1,r1),...,(vm,rm) with his private key K−1
B secret.
• Show Certiﬁcate: Bob, a certiﬁcate holder, establishes a secure communication channel with Alice, a
service provider, and at the same time proves to Alice the ownership of an OACert. In this protocol, Alice
checks the signature and the validity period of the certiﬁcate, then veriﬁes that the certiﬁcate has not been
revoked (using, e.g., standard techniques in [26]). Alice also veriﬁes that Bob possesses the private key
corresponding to KB in the OACert. All these can be done using standard protocols such as TLS/SSL [35].
• Show Attribute: Bob can show any subset of his attributes using the show attribute protocols. These pro-
tocols are executed after the show certiﬁcate protocol, through a secure communication channel between
Alice and Bob. To show t attributes, Bob runs show attribute protocols t times. There are three kinds of
show attribute protocols; each gives different computational and communication complexity and privacy
level.
1. direct show: Bob gives vi and ri directly to Alice, and Alice veriﬁes ci = commit(vi,ri). This
protocol is used when Bob trusts Alice with the attribute values, or when Bob is very weak in com-
putational power. This protocol is the most efﬁcient one but offers the least privacy protection. Alice
not only knows vi but also can convince others that Bob has attribute vi.
2. zero-knowledge show: Bob uses zero-knowledge proofs to prove vi satisﬁes some properties Alice
requires, e.g., is equal to some value or belongs to some range. This kind of protocols is more
expensive than the direct show, but offers better privacy protection. Alice learns whether vi satisﬁes
her policies, but she cannot convince others about this. Alice also doesn’t learn the exact value of vi
provided that multiple values satisfy her policies.
3. oblivious show: Bob interacts with Alice using OCBE protocols. Alice learns nothing about vi. This
kind of oblivious show protocols offers the best privacy protection among the three types of protocols.
Often times, it has similar or less amount of computation as the zero-knowledge show protocols.
3.2 Applications of OACerts
The OACerts scheme enables oblivious access control, an service provider can perform access control on re-
sources without learning any information about the attributes of requesters.
OACerts can also be used in other settings. One of the original motivations for introducing OSBE [27] was
to break policy cycles in Automated Trust Negotiation [42, 41, 43, 45]. The following scenario was described
in [27]: user Alice has a certiﬁcate showing that she has top-secret clearance. To protect herself, Alice will only
present the certiﬁcate to other parties who also have a top-secret clearance certiﬁcate. Similarly, user Bob has a
top-secret certiﬁcate and he will only reveal his certiﬁcate to others who are top-secret clearance. When Alice
and Bob wish to establish a secure session using automated trust negotiation techniques, neither one is willing to
present his/her certiﬁcate ﬁrst. Consequently, they are stuck and cannot establish the session.
Such policy cycles and those cycles involving predicates on attribute values may be broken using OACerts
and OCBE. Suppose both Alice and Bob have OACerts and security clearance is an attribute, Alice and Bob
can ﬁrst exchange their certiﬁcates, then Bob uses OCBE scheme to send Alice the zero-knowledge proof of his
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certain that his security clearance attribute is revealed to Alice only if Alice has top security clearance.
4 A Commitment Scheme and Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Certain Problems
In this section, we ﬁrst review the Pedersen commitment scheme [32], which we use in the OCBE protocols and
OACerts. We then review two zero-knowledge proof protocols [12, 14, 31, 21, 19] that prove certain properties
of values committed under the Pedersen commitment scheme.
Deﬁnition 1 (The Pedersen Commitment Scheme)
Setup A trusted third party T chooses two large prime numbers p and q such that q divides p−1. (It is typical to
have p be 1024 bits and q be 160 bits.) Let g be a generator of Gq, the unique order-q subgroup of Z∗
p. We
use x ← Zq to denote that x is uniformly randomly chosen from Zq. T picks x ← Zq, let h = (gx mod p).
T keeps the value x secret and makes the values p,q,g,h public.
Commit The domain of the committed values is Zq. For a party A to commit an integer a ∈ Zq, A chooses
r ← Zq and computes the commitment c = (gahr mod p).
Open To open a commitment c, A reveals a and r, and a veriﬁer veriﬁes whether c = (gahr mod p).
The above setting is slightly different from the standard setting of commitment schemes, in which the veriﬁer
runs the setup program and does a zero-knowledge proof to convince A that the parameters are constructed
properly. We have a trusted third party to generate the parameters, because this is done by a CA in the OACerts
scheme.
The above commitment scheme is unconditionally hiding: Even with unlimited computational power it is
impossible for an adversary to learn any information about the value a from c, because given any commitment
c every value a is equally likely to be the value committed in c. This commitment scheme is computationally
binding: Under the discrete logarithm assumption, it is computationally infeasible for an adversarial committer
to open a value a0 other than a in the open phase of the commitment scheme. Suppose one ﬁnds a0 and r0 such
that ga0
hr0
≡ gahr(mod p), then he can compute a0−a
r−r0 mod q, which is logg(h), the discrete logarithm of h with
respect to the base g.
Since the domain of the Pedersen commitment scheme is integers in Zq, it is necessary to map an arbitrary
attribute value to an integer in the OACerts scheme. For example in a digital driver license, gender can be
expressed by a single bit, state can be expressed by a number from [1,50], birth-date can be expressed by the
numberofdaysbetweenJanuary1stof1900andthedateofbirth. Foranattributevaluethatcannotberepresented
by a number such as home address, the CA can hash the attribute using a collision-free hash function.
Recall that in the OACerts scheme, a certiﬁcate holder needs to be able to prove that an attribute in the
certiﬁcate satisﬁes some property without revealing the actual value. We here review two classic zero-knowledge
proofs for values committed using the Pedersen commitment scheme. One protocol proves that a committed
value is a bit; the other protocol proves that a committed value belongs to an interval. We present these protocols
in detail because our OCBE schemes are built on these protocols by adding the oblivious feature.
Protocol 1 (Bit Proof Protocol) Let hp,q,g,hi be the public parameters and c is a commitment of a. The prover
proves to the veriﬁer that a is from set {0,1} without revealing a.
The bit proof protocol has appeared in several places [14, 31]. The basic idea is to show either c = ghr or
c = hr without revealing which one is the case. In other words, the prover proves that he knows either logh(c)
or logh(c/g). This is done using Schnorr’s proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm [38] and proofs of partial
knowledge [13]. Recall that to prove one knows r such that hr = x using the Schnorr protocol, one chooses a
7Prover Veriﬁer
Case 1: c = hr Case 2: c = ghr
w,z1,e1 ← Zq
α0 = hw
α1 = hz1(c/g)−e1
w,z0,e0 ← Zq
α0 = hz0c−e0
α1 = hw
α0,α1 -
e ← Zq e ￿
e0 = ((e − e1) mod q)
z0 = ((w + re0) mod q)
e1 = ((e − e0) mod q)
z1 = ((w + re1) mod q)
z0,z1,e0,e1 - e
? = e0 + e1 (mod q)
hz0 ? = α0c−e0
hz1 ? = α1(c/g)−e1
accepts when all checks succeed
Figure 1: Bit proof protocol with public parameters hp,q,g,hi. All computations are modulo p unless explicitly
speciﬁed.
random w and sends α = hw to the veriﬁer, who then challenges with a random e. The prover sends z = w +re
to the veriﬁer, which checks whether α = hzx−e. If the prover can predict the challenge, the prover can cheat by
picking a random z ﬁrst and sending α = hzx−e in the ﬁrst message. In the bit-proof protocol, the prover knows
either logh(c) or logh(c/g). He uses the Schnorr protocol to prove the one he knows and cheats on the other one.
The protocol is presented in Figure 1.
Correctness of this protocol is discussed in Appendix A.1. We observe that this protocol requires three
rounds, the prover does three exponentiations, and the veriﬁer does four exponentiations.
Protocol 2 (Range Proof Protocol) Let hp,q,g,hi be the public parameters and c is a commitment of a. The
prover proves to the veriﬁer that a belongs to the interval [0..2` − 1] without revealing the actual a.
This range proof appeared in [31, 19]. Let c = commit(a,r) = gahr be the commitment of a ∈ [0..2` − 1]
with secret random r ∈ Zq. Let a`−1 ...a1a0 be the binary representation of a, i.e., a = a020 + a121 + ··· +
a`−12`−1 =
P`−1
i=0 ai2i. The prover picks r1,...,r`−1 ← Zq and computes r0 = r −
P`−1
i=1 2iri. The prover
computes ci = commit(ai,ri) = gaihri for i = 0,1,...,` − 1 and sends them to the veriﬁer. Then the prover
runs the bit proof protocol with the veriﬁer to prove that ai is either 0 or 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1. Finally, the veriﬁer
checks that
Q`−1
i=0(ci)2i
= c.
If c is a commitment of a ∈ [0..2`−1] and both parties follow the protocol, then the veriﬁer is convinced, because
`−1 Y
i=0
(ci)2i
=
`−1 Y
i=0
(gaihri)2i
= g
P`−1
i=0 ai2i
h
P`−1
i=0 ri2i
= gahr = c (mod p)
If the prover is able to convince the veriﬁer, then for each ci, 0 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1, the prover knows ai ∈ {0,1} and
ri such that ci = gaihri. The prover thus knows a0 =
P`−1
i=0 ai2i and r0 =
P`−1
i=0 ri2i such that c = ga0
hr0
.
Assuming that Discrete Logarithm is hard, a0 = a and r0 = r; thus a is in the range [0..2` − 1].
The range proof protocol runs ` bit proof protocol instances. It takes three rounds when these instances
are run in parallel. Overall, the prover does about 4` exponentiations (computing each ci amounts to about 1
8exponentiation), and the veriﬁer does about 4` exponentiations plus
`(`+1)
2 multiplications. When ` is about 20
(which is sufﬁcient to represent birth-dates) and q is 160-bit, then computing
`(`+1)
2 multiplications takes about
the same time as several exponentiations. The range proof protocol can be used to prove that a committed value
is greater-than-or-equal-to another value. The basic idea for doing this is used in our GE-OCBE protocol in
Section 5.3.
5 Oblivious Commitment-Based Envelope (OCBE)
The OACerts scheme requires OCBE schemes, which enable oblivious show of attributes in OACerts.
5.1 Deﬁnition of OCBE
Inthissection, we giveaformaldeﬁnitionofOCBE. Weusethefollowingterminology. Afunctionf isnegligible
in the security parameter t if, for every polynomial p, f(t) is smaller than 1/|p(t)| for large enough t; otherwise,
it is non-negligible. An adversary is a probabilistic interactive Turing Machine [23].
Deﬁnition 2 (OCBE) An Oblivious Commitment-Based Envelope (OCBE) scheme is parameterized by a com-
mitment scheme commit. An OCBE scheme involves a sender S, a receiver R, and a trusted third party T, and
has the following four phases:
Setup The Setup algorithm takes a security parameter t and outputs public parameters CP for commit, a set V
of possible values, and a set P of predicates. Each predicate in P maps an element in V to either true or
false. The domain of commitCP contains V as a subset.
The sender, the receiver, and the trusted third party share CP and the descriptions of V and P.
Pre-interaction The sender chooses a message M ∈ {0,1}∗. The receiver chooses a value a ∈ V. The sender
and the receiver agree1 on a predicate Pred ∈ P. The trusted third party T computes the commitment
c = commitCP(a,r) where a is the committed value and r is a random number. T gives r and c to the
receiver, and c to the sender.2
The sender S has Pred, c, and M. The receiver R has Pred, c, a, and r.
Interaction S and R run an interactive protocol, during which an envelope containing an encryption of M is
delivered from S to R.
Open After the interaction phase, if Pred(a) is true, R outputs the message M. Otherwise, R does nothing.
An OCBE scheme must satisfy the following three properties. It must be sound, oblivious, and semantically
secure against the receiver.
Sound An OCBE scheme is sound if in the case that Pred(a) is true, R can output the message M with
overwhelming probability. That is, when Pred(a) is true, the probability that R cannot output M is negligible.
Oblivious An OCBE scheme is oblivious if the sender S learns nothing about a. More precisely, no
adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against the Challenger in the game described in Figure 2.
In other words, an OCBE scheme is oblivious if for every probabilistic interactive Turing Machine A,
|Pr[A wins the game in Figure 2] − 1
2 | ≤ f(t), where f is a negligible function in t. (The adversary cannot
do substantially better than random guessing.)
1The main effect of having both the sender and the receiver to affect the predicate is such that in the security deﬁnitions both an
adversarial sender and an adversarial receiver can choose the predicate they want to attack on.
2Here the commitment c is computed by T because this is done by a CA in the OACerts scheme.
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1. runs setup phase.
2. CP,desc(V),desc(P) -
3. chooses M ∈ {0,1}∗,
Pred ∈ P, a1,a2 ∈ V.
4. Pred,a1,a2 ￿
5. chooses b ∈ {1,2},
sets a = ab,
c = commitCP(a,r).
6. c -
emulate the receiver emulate the sender
7. interaction - ￿
8. b0
￿
Adversary wins the game if b = b0.
Figure 2: The attacker game for the oblivious property of OCBE. We use desc(V) to denote the description of V and
desc(P) for the description of P. We allow the adversary to pick a predicate Pred and two attribute values a1,a2 of its
choice; yet the adversary sill should not be able to distinguish a receiver with attribute a1 from one with attribute a2.
Semantically secure against the receiver An OCBE scheme is semantically secure against the receiver if R
learns nothing about M when Pred(a) is false. More precisely, no adversary A has a non-negligible advantage
against the Challenger in the game described in Figure 3.
We assume that the interaction phase of OCBE is executed on top of a previously established private com-
munication channel between the sender and the receiver. Recall that the certiﬁcate holder establishes an SSL
channel with the service provider during the show certiﬁcate protocol described in Section 3.
In our proofs, we use the random oracle model, which is an idealized security model introduced by Bellare
and Rogaway [2] to analyze the security of certain natural cryptographic constructions. Roughly speaking, a
random oracle is a function H: X → Y chosen uniformly at random from the set of all functions {h: X → Y }
(we assume Y is a ﬁnite set). An algorithm can query the random oracle at any point x ∈ X and receive the value
H(x) in response. Random oracles are used to model cryptographic hash functions such as SHA-1. Note that
security in the random oracle model does not imply security in the real world. Nevertheless, the random oracle
model is a useful tool for validating natural cryptographic constructions.
5.2 EQ-OCBE: an OCBE protocol for equality predicates
In this section, we present an OCBE protocol (EQ-OCBE) for the Pedersen commitment scheme with equality
predicates. Our EQ-OCBE protocol runs a Difﬁe-Hellman style key-agreement protocol [18]. If the committed
value a is equal to a0, then R can derive the shared secret. If the committed value a is not equal to a0, then R
cannot derive the shared secret.
Deﬁnition 3 (EQ-OCBE) Let E be a semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme. Let H be a function
(e.g., a cryptographic hash function) that extracts a key for E from a shared secret.
Setup The setup algorithm takes a security parameter t and runs the setup algorithm of the Pedersen commitment
scheme to create CP = hp,q,g,hi. It also outputs V = Zq and P = {EQa0 | a0 ∈ V}, where EQa0: V →
{true,false}, such that EQa0(a) is true if a = a0 and false if a 6= a0.
10Challenger Adversary (receiver)
1. runs setup phase.
2. CP,desc(V),desc(P) -
3. picks a ∈ V.
4. a ￿
5. c = commitCP(a,r).
6. c,r -
7. chooses Pred ∈ P,
s.t., Pred(a) = false, and
equal-length M1,M2 ∈ {0,1}∗.
8. Pred,M1,M2 ￿
9. chooses b ∈ {1,2},
sets M = Mb.
emulate the sender emulate the receiver
10. interaction - ￿
11. b0
￿
Adversary wins the game if b = b0.
Figure 3: The attacker game for OCBE’s semantic security property against the receiver. Even if we give the adversary the
power to pick two equal-length messages M1 and M2 of its choice, it still cannot distinguish an envelope containing M1
from one containing M2. This formalizes the intuitive notion that the envelope leaks no information about its content.
Pre-interaction The sender chooses a message M ∈ {0,1}∗. The receiver chooses an integer a ∈ V. The sender
and the receiver agree on a predicate EQa0 ∈ P. The trusted third party T picks r ← Zq and computes the
commitment c = (gahr mod p). T gives r and c to the receiver, and c to the sender.
The sender S has EQa0, c, and M. The receiver R has EQa0, c, a, and r.
Interaction S picks y ← Z∗
q, computes σ = ((cg−a0)y mod p), and then sends to R the pair: hη =
(hy mod p),C = EH(σ)[M]i.
Open R receives hη,Ci from the interaction phase; if EQa0(a) is true, it computes σ0 = (ηr mod p), and
decrypts C using H(σ0).
To see that EQ-OCBE is sound, observe that when EQa0(a) is true,
σ = (cg−a0)y = (ga−a0hr)y = (hr)y = (hy)r = ηr = σ0 (mod p)
Therefore S and R share the same symmetric key.
Also observe that the interaction phase of EQ-OCBE is one-round; it involves only one message from the
sender S to the receiver R. In the interaction and open phases, S does three exponentiations and R does one
exponentiation.
The key idea of EQ-OCBE is that if R’s committed value a is equal to a0, S can compute cg−a0 = ga−a0hr =
hr(mod p). S now holds hr such that R knows the value r. This achieves half of the Difﬁe-Hellman key-
agreement protocol [18], with h as the base. S then does the other half by sending hy to R. Now both R and
S can compute hry. If R’s committed value a is not equal to a0, then it is presumably hard for R to compute
logh(cg−a0). The reason is if R is able to ﬁnd a number r0 = logh(cg−a0), R can effectively break the binding
property of the commitment scheme, i.e., he ﬁnds a (a0,r0) pair such that ga0hr0
= gahr.
Theorem 1 EQ-OCBE is oblivious.
11The proofs for this theorem as well as all other theorems are in Appendix A.
EQ-OCBE does a Difﬁe-Hellman style key agreement that has the added twist that one party can recover the
shared key only when the committed value a is equal to a0. We base the security of EQ-OCBE on the hardness
of the CDH (Computational Difﬁe-Hellman) problem in Z∗
p. The CDH problem is the following: given a ﬁnite
cyclic group G, a generator g ∈ G, and group elements ga,gb, ﬁnd gab. The difﬁculty of this problem is the
security foundation of Difﬁe-Hellman key-agreement protocol and many other protocols. The CDH assumption
is that there exists no polynomial probabilistic algorithm that can solve the CDH problem.
Theorem 2 Under the CDH assumption on Gq, the order-q subgroup of Z∗
p, and assuming that H is modelled
as a random oracle, EQ-OCBE is secure against the receiver.
5.3 GE-OCBE: an OCBE protocol for greater-than-or-equal-to predicates
In this section, we present an OCBE protocol (GE-OCBE) for the Pedersen commitment scheme with greater-
than-or-equal-to predicates.
The basic idea of the GE-OCBE protocol is as follows. Let hp,q,g,hi be the parameters for the Pedersen
commitment scheme. Let ` be an integer such that 2` < q/2. Let a and a0 be two numbers in [0..2` − 1], and
let d = ((a − a0) mod q). We have a ≥ a0 if and only if d ∈ [0..2` − 1]. Let c = gahr be a commitment
of a such that a party R knows r, then cg−a0 = gdhr is a commitment of d that R knows how to open. Recall
that the range proof protocol (Protocol 2 in Section 4) enables R to prove that d belongs to [0..2` − 1] without
leaking any information about d, by generating ` new commitments c0,...,c`−1, one for each of the ` bits of d,
and conducting a bit proof (Protocol 1) for each ci. Our GE-OCBE protocol adds a twist to this protocol. R only
proves that the committed values in c1,...,c`−1 are bits. For bit 0, R runs a protocol with the other party S such
that R obtains a secret shared with S only when he can open c0 as a bit, yet at the same time S learns nothing
about what R committed in c0.
Deﬁnition 4 (GE-OCBE) Let E be a semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme. Let H be a function
(e.g., a cryptographic hash function) that extracts a key for E from a shared secret.
Setup The setup algorithm takes two parameters, a security parameter t and a parameter `, which speciﬁes the
desired range of the attribute values. The setup algorithm runs the commitment setup algorithm to create
CP = hp,q,g,hi such that 2` < q/2. It also outputs V = [0..2` − 1] and P = {GEa0 | a0 ∈ V}, where
GEa0: V → {true,false}, such that GEa0(a) is true if a ≥ a0 and false otherwise.
Pre-interaction The sender chooses a message M ∈ {0,1}∗. The receiver chooses an integer a ∈ V. The sender
and the receiver agree on a predicate GEa0 ∈ P. The trusted third party T picks r ← Zq and computes the
commitment c = (gahr mod p). T gives r and c to the receiver, and c to the sender.
The sender S has GEa0, c, and M. The receiver R has GEa0, c, a, and r.
Interaction Let d denote (a − a0) mod q, GEa0(a) = true if and only if d ∈ [0..2` − 1]. Note that cg−a0 =
gdhr(mod p) is a commitment of d that R can open.
1. R picks r1,...,r`−1 ← Zq and sets r0 = r −
P`−1
i=1 2iri mod q. When GEa0(a) = true, let
d`−1 ...d1d0 be the binary representation of d, i.e., d = d020 + d121 + ··· + d`−12`−1. When
GEa0(a) = false, R randomly picks d1,d2,...,d`−1 ← {0,1}, and sets d0 = d−
P`−1
i=1 2idi mod q.
Observe that d0 is neither 0 nor 1 in this case.
2. R computes ` commitments ci = commitCP(di,ri) = gdihri mod p, for 0 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1. R sends
c0,...,c`−1 to S.
123. For each i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1, R proves to S that each di committed in ci is either 0 or 1, using
the bit proof protocol in Figure 1.
4. S veriﬁes that cg−a0 =
Q`−1
i=0(ci)2i
mod p. S picks y ← Z∗
q, computes σ0 = ((c0)y mod p) and
σ1 = ((c0g−1)y mod p). S sends to R the tuple: hη = (hy mod p),C0 = EH(σ0)[M],C1 =
EH(σ1)[M]i.
Open R receives hη,C0,C1i from the interaction phase. If GEa0(a) is true, it computes σ0 = (ηr0 mod p) and
decrypts Cd0 using H(σ0) to recover M.
To see that this scheme is sound, observe that when GEa0(a) is true, d0 is either 0 or 1. If d0 = 0, σ0 =
(c0)y = (gd0hr0)y = (hy)r0 = ηr0 = σ0(mod p), R candecryptC0. Ifd0 = 1, σ1 = (c0g−1)y = (gd0−1hr0)y =
(hy)r0 = ηr0 = σ0(mod p), R can decrypt C1.
The interaction phase of GE-OCBE can be done in four rounds. In the ﬁrst round, R sends c0,··· ,c`−1 to
S as well as the α0,α1’s needed for the bit proofs. In the second round, S replies with challenges for the bit
proofs. In the third round, R sends the responses for the bit proofs. In the fourth round, S sends the envelope. In
the interaction and open phases, both R and S conduct about 4` exponentiations. The amount of computation is
comparable to that in a zero-knowledge proof using the range proof protocol.
Theorem 3 GE-OCBE is oblivious.
Theorem 4 Under the CDH assumption on Gq, the order-q subgroup of Z∗
p, and assuming that H is modelled
as a random oracle, GE-OCBE is secure against the receiver.
5.4 GE-OCBE2: an alternative OCBE protocol for greater-than-or-equal-to predicates
In this section, we present another OCBE protocol (GE-OCBE2) for the Pedersen commitment scheme with
greater-than-or-equal-to predicates GE. The GE-OCBE2 protocol is more efﬁcient than the GE-OCBE protocol;
however, its security property is proved based on a weaker assumption.
In GE-OCBE, we run ` − 1 bit proof protocols for c1,··· ,c`−1 and a “bit-OCBE” protocol for c0 — if a bit
is committed in c0, then the receiver can decrypt. In GE-OCBE2, we run ` instances of the “bit-OCBE” protocol,
one for each ci, and the receiver can recover a key only when a bit is committed in each ci.
Deﬁnition 5 (GE-OCBE2) Let E be a semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme. Let H be a function
(e.g., a cryptographic hash function) that extracts a key for E from a shared secret. The Setup and Pre-interaction
phases are same as those in the GE-OCBE protocol.
Interaction Let d denote (a − a0) mod q, GEa0(a) = true if and only if d ∈ [0..2` − 1]. Note that cg−a0 =
gdhr(mod p) is a commitment of d that R can open.
1. R picks r1,...,r`−1 ← Zq and sets r0 = r −
P`−1
i=1 2iri mod q. When GEa0(a) = true, let
d`−1 ...d1d0 be the binary representation of d, i.e., d = d020 + d121 + ··· + d`−12`−1. When
GEa0(a) = false, R randomly picks d1,d2,...,d`−1 ← Zq, and sets d0 = d −
P`−1
i=1 2idi mod q.
2. R computes ` commitments ci = commitCP(di,ri) = gdihri mod p, for 0 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1. R sends
c0,...,c`−1 to S.
3. S veriﬁes that cg−a0 =
Q`−1
i=0(ci)2i
mod p. S randomly chooses ` symmetric keys k0,...,k`−1 and
sets k = k0 ⊕ ··· ⊕ k`−1. S picks y ← Z∗
q, computes η = (hy mod p) and C = Ek[M]. For each
0 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1, S computes σ0
i = ((ci)y mod p), σ1
i = ((cig−1)y mod p), C0
i = EH(σ0
i )[ki], and
C1
i = EH(σ1
i )[ki]. S sends to R the tuple: hη,C0
0,C1
0,...,C0
`−1,C1
`−1,Ci.
13Open R receives hη,C0
0,C1
0,...,C0
`−1,C1
`−1,Ci from the interaction phase. If GEa0(a) is true, a − a0 =
P`−1
i=0 2idi where di is from {0,1}. For each 0 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1, R computes σ0
i = (ηri mod p), and uses
H(σ0
i) to decrypt C
di
i and derive k0
i. Then R computes k0 as k0
0 ⊕ ··· ⊕ k0
`−1. Finally, R decrypts C using
k0.
To see that this scheme is sound, observe that when GEa0(a) is true, d0,...,d`−1 are either 0 or 1. For each
0 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1, if di = 0, σ0
i = (ci)y = (gdihri)y = (hy)ri = ηri = σ0(mod p), R can decrypt C0
i and get ki;
if di = 1, σ1
i = (cig−1)y = (gdi−1hri)y = (hy)ri = ηri = σ0(mod p), R can decrypt C1
i and get ki. Because
k = k0 ⊕ ··· ⊕ k`−1, R can successfully reconstruct k. Therefore S and R share the same symmetric key k if
GEa0(a) is true.
GE-OCBE2 requires two rounds whereas GE-OCBE requires four rounds. The receiver does about 2` ex-
ponentiations. The sender does about ` exponentiations (observe that σ1
i can be computed as σ0
i g−y, where g−y
needs to be computed only once).
Theorem 5 GE-OCBE2 is oblivious.
The security of GE-OCBE2 is based on a non-standard computational assumption related to the CDH prob-
lem. The assumption was originally proposed by Damg˚ ard [16] and was also used in Hada and Tanaka [24]. The
assumption, which was called DA-1 in [24], says that given randomly chosen instances of the discrete logarithm
problem (p,q,g,gq), it is infeasible to compute (B,X) such that X = Ba mod p without knowing the value b
satisfying B = gb mod p.
Theorem 6 Under the DA-1 assumption and the DL assumption (discrete logarithm is hard) on Gq, the order-q
subgroup of Z∗
p, and assuming that H is modelled as a random oracle, GE-OCBE2 is secure against the receiver.
5.5 OCBE protocols for other predicates
In this section, we ﬁrst present two logical combination OCBE protocols, one for ∧ (AND-OCBE), the other for
∨ (OR-OCBE). Then we describe OCBE protocols for comparison predicates: > (GT-OCBE), ≤ (LE-OCBE),
< (LT-OCBE), 6= (NE-OCBE). Finally, we present an OCBE protocol for range predicates (RANGE-OCBE). In
stead of formally presenting these protocols, we brieﬂy sketch the ideas. We use OCBE(Pred,M) to denote an
OCBE protocol with predicate Pred, it outputs M if the predicate is true.
1. AND-OCBE: Suppose there exists OCBE protocols for Pred1 and Pred2, the goal is to build an OCBE
protocol for the new predicate Pred = Pred1 ∧ Pred2. An OCBE(Pred1 ∧ Pred2,M) can be con-
structed as follows: The sender picks two random keys k1 and k2 and sets k = k1 ⊕ k2. The sender
runs OCBE(Pred1,k1) and OCBE(Pred2,k2) with the receiver. Finally, the sender sends Ek[M] to the
receiver. The receiver can recover M only if both Pred1 and Pred2 are true.
2. OR-OCBE: An OCBE(Pred1∨Pred2,M) can be constructed as follows: The sender picks a random key
k. The sender runs OCBE(Pred1,k) and OCBE(Pred2,k) with the receiver. Finally, the sender sends
Ek[M] to the receiver. The receiver can recover M if either Pred1 or Pred2 is true.
3. GT-OCBE: For integer space, a > a0 is equivalent to a ≥ a0 + 1. An OCBE(>a0,M) protocol is
equivalent to an OCBE(≥a0+1,M) protocol.
4. LE-OCBE: The idea of LE-OCBE protocol is similar to the GE-OCBE protocol. Observe that a ≤ a0 if
and only if d = ((a0 − a) mod q) ∈ [0..2` − 1]. Let c = gahr be a commitment of a, then ga0c−1 =
g(a0−a) mod qh−r mod q is a commitment of d such that the receiver knows how to open. The LE-OCBE
protocol uses the same method as in GE-OCBE.
145. LT-OCBE: For integer space, a < a0 is equivalent to a ≤ a0 − 1. An OCBE(<a0,M) protocol is
equivalent to an OCBE(≤a0−1,M) protocol.
6. NE-OCBE: a 6= a0 is equivalent to (a > a0) ∨ (a < a0). Therefore, an OCBE(6=a0,M) can be built as
OCBE(>a0 ∨ <a0,M).
7. RANGE-OCBE: a0 ≤ a ≤ a1 is equivalent to (a ≥ a0) ∧ (a ≤ a1). Therefore, a RANGE-OCBE can be
built as OCBE(≥a0 ∧ ≤a1,M).
6 Implementation and Performance
We implemented the three kinds of show attribute protocols in Java with Java 2 Platform v1.4.2 SDK. We use
the Pedersen commitment scheme with security parameters p = 1024 bits and q = 160 bits. Thus the size of
a commitment is 1024 bits, or 128 bytes. We set the attribute values in OACerts to be either unsigned short or
unsigned long, i.e., ` = 16 or ` = 32. For instance, the direct show protocol requires a certiﬁcate holder sending
a and r, if the attribute value a is 32 bits, the total size of communication in that protocol is 20 bytes (160 + 32
bits).
In the implementation of OCBE protocols, we use MD5 as the cryptographic hash function, AES as the
symmetric key encryption scheme. Given an arbitrary size message, MD5 outputs a 128-bit message digest. In
our setting, M is typically a 16 bytes symmetric key, the size of E[M] is also 16 bytes using AES in ECB mode.
In EQ-OCBE, η is 128 bytes (1024 bits) and C is 16 bytes, the total size of communication is 144 bytes.
We ran our implementation on a 2.53GMz Intel Pentium 4 machine with 384MB RAM running RedHat
Linux 9.0. We simulate the certiﬁcate holder and service provider on the same machine. With p of size 1024
bits and q of size 160 bits in the Pedersen commitment scheme, and ` = 32, the performance of different show
attribute protocols is summarized in Table 1. As can be seen, the direct show protocol is most efﬁcient and takes
only 25 ms. The zero-knowledge show protocols and oblivious show protocols have similar execution times
and amounts of communication. Also observe that GE-OCBE2 is more efﬁcient than GE-OCBE and the zero-
knowledge protocol for proving the ≥ relation; it improves the performance approximately by a factor of 2. We
compare the performance of show attribute protocols on different attribute sizes in Table 2, ` = 32 is roughly
two-times expensive as ` = 16.
execution time communication size
Direct Show 25 ms 24 bytes
Zero-knowledge Show (prove a = a0) 28 ms 168 bytes
Zero-knowledge Show (prove a ≥ a0) 2.2 s 15 KB
Oblivious show (EQ-OCBE) 75 ms 144 bytes
Oblivious Show (GE-OCBE) 2.2 s 15 KB
Oblivious Show (GE-OCBE2) 0.9 s 5.1 KB
Table1: Runningtime andsizeofcommunication ona2.53GMzIntelPentium 4runningRedHat Linux. Security
parameters are ` = 32, p = 1024 bits, and q = 160 bits.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed Oblivious Attribute Certiﬁcates (OACerts), an attribute certiﬁcate scheme in which
a certiﬁcate holder can select which attributes to use and how to use them. In particular, one can use attributes
in OACerts in an oblivious fashion. We introduced Oblivious Commitment Based Envelope (OCBE) to enable
15GE-ZKShow GE-OCBE GE-OCBE2
time size time size time size
` = 16 1.1 s 7.5 KB 1.1 s 7.4 KB 0.5 s 2.6 KB
` = 32 2.2 s 15 KB 2.2 s 15 KB 0.9 s 5.1 KB
Table 2: Compare running time and size of communication on two different `, on a 2.53GMz Intel Pentium 4
running RedHat Linux. Security parameters are p = 1024 bits, and q = 160 bits.
the oblivious usage of OACerts. We developed provably secure and efﬁcient OCBE protocols for the Pedersen
commitment scheme and predicates such as =,≥,≤,>,<,6= as well as logical combinations of them. Our
implementation showed that the OACerts scheme is practical and efﬁcient. Future work includes investigation of
applying OACerts and OCBE to Automated Trusted Negotiation and other areas.
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A Proofs
A.1 Correctness of Protocol 1
The Bit Proof protocol is zero-knowledge when e is small. Even with large e, the veriﬁer still cannot distinguish
whether the Prover committed a 0 or a 1 in c, since what the Prover sends in the two cases are drawn from the
same distribution.
We now show that the protocol is indeed a proof of partial knowledge by constructing a knowledge extractor.
Suppose that a prover is challenged twice on the same α0,α1, ﬁrst with e and then with e0 6= e, and the prover
succeeds both times. Then we have z0,z1,e0,e1 and z0
0,z0
1,e0
0,e0
1 such that
e0 + e1 = e (mod q) α0 c−e0 = hz0 (mod p) α1 (c/g)−e1 = hz1 (mod p)
e0
0 + e0
1 = e0 (mod q) α0 c−e0
0 = hz0
0 (mod p) α1 (c/g)−e0
1 = hz0
1 (mod p)
Because e 6= e0, it has to be either e0 6= e0
0 or e1 6= e0
1. When e0 6= e0
0, one can compute r = ((z0 −z0
0)(e0
0 −
e0)−1 mod q) such that c = hr(mod p). When e1 6= e0
1, one can compute r = ((z1 − z0
1)(e0
1 − e0)−1 mod q)
such that c = ghr(mod p).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The interaction phase involves only one message from the sender to the receiver. Among what the sender
sees, the only piece of information that is related to the receiver’s attribute value a is the commitment c. As
the Pedersen commitment scheme is unconditionally hiding; c does not leak any information about a. Thus
EQ-OCBE is oblivious even against an inﬁnitely powerful adversary.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. EQ-OCBE uses a semantically secure symmetric encryption algorithm. When H is modelled as a random
oracle, EQ-OCBE is secure against the receiver when no receiver whose committed value is not equal to a0
16can compute with non-negligible probability the secret that the sender uses to derive the encryption key. More
precisely, EQ-OCBE is secure against the receiver if no polynomially bounded adversary wins the following
game against the Challenger with non-negligible probability (this game is instantiated from the game in Figure 3
with details from the EQ-OCBE protocol): The Challenger runs the setup phase and sends CP = hp,q,g,hi
and the descriptions of V and EQ to the adversary. The adversary picks an integer a ∈ V. The Challenger
chooses r ← Zq and computes the commitment of a as c = (gahr mod p), and gives r and c to the adversary.
The adversary responds with an equality predicate EQa0 such that EQa0(a) is false. The Challenger then picks
y ← Z∗
q and sends to the adversary hy mod p. The adversary then outputs σ, and the adversary wins the game if
σ = (cg−a0)y mod p.
Given an attacker A that wins the above game with probability ￿, we construct another attacker B that can
solve the CDH problem in Gq, the order-q subgroup of Z∗
p, with the same probability. B does the following (all
arithmetic is mod p):
1. B, when given p,q,h ∈ Gq,hx,hy, gives CP = hp,q,hx,hi and the descriptions of V = Zq and P =
{EQa0 | a0 ∈ V} to A.
2. B receives an integer a ∈ Zq from A, picks r ← Zq, computes c = (hx)ahr, and sends r and c to A.
3. B receives an equality predicate EQa0 from A such that a 6= a0, and sends hy to A.
4. B receives σ from A, computes δ = σh−ry, and outputs δ(a−a0)−1 mod q.
When A wins the game, σ = (c(hx)−a0)y = ((hx)a−a0hr)y = (hxy)a−a0hry, then δ = σh−ry =
(hxy)a−a0. B outputs δ(a−a0)−1 mod q = hxy.
B succeeds in solving the CDH problem if and only if A wins the above game, i.e., successfully compute
(cg−a0)y mod p.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Consider the game for the oblivious property of OCBE (in Figure 2), let us examine what an adversary
wouldseeinthecaseofGE-OCBE.Theadversaryseesacommitmentcand`commitmentsc0,...,c`−1 suchthat
cg−a0 =
Q`−1
i=0(ci)2i
mod p. The adversary also participates as the veriﬁer in the bit proof protocols conducted
for each ci where 1 ≤ i ≤ `−1. The joint distribution of c,c0,...,c`−1 is independent of whether the Challenger
picked a0 or a1, as c,c1,...,c`−1 are totally random (because of the random choices of r,r1,...,r`−1), and c0
is always equal to cg−a0 Q`−1
i=1(ci)−2i
mod p. From the bit proof protocols, the adversary learns only that the
Challenger is able to open ci with either 0 or 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1. This does not leak any information about
whether a0 or a1 was chosen because the Challenger can do this in either case. Thus GE-OCBE is oblivious even
against an inﬁnitely powerful adversary.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. GE-OCBE uses a semantically secure symmetric encryption algorithm. When H is modelled as a random
oracle, GE-OCBE is secure against the receiver when no receiver whose committed value a does not satisfy GEa0
can compute with non-negligible probability the secret that the sender uses to derive the encryption key. More
precisely, GE-OCBE is secure against the receiver if no polynomially bounded adversary wins the following
game against the Challenger with non-negligible probability (this game is instantiated from the game in Figure 3
with details from the GE-OCBE protocol): The Challenger runs the setup phase and sends CP = hp,q,g,hi and
the descriptions of V and GE to the adversary. The adversary picks an integer a ∈ V. The Challenger chooses
a random r ← Zq and computes the commitment of a as c = (gahr mod p). The adversary responds with a
greater-than-or-equal-topredicateGEa0 suchthatGEa0(a)isfalse. Theadversaryrespondswiththecommitments
c0,c1,...,c`−1 such that cg−a0 =
Q`−1
i=0(ci)2i
mod p. The adversary proves that he can open c1,...,c`−1 with
17bits using the bit proof protocol. The Challenger then picks y ← Z∗
q and sends to the adversary hy mod p. The
adversary then outputs σ, and the adversary wins the game if σ = ((c0)y mod p) or σ = ((c0g−1)y mod p).
The CDH assumption in Gq implies the assumption that discrete logarithm in Gq is hard. Under this as-
sumption, the bit proof protocol proves that the committed value is indeed from {0,1} [14]. Because the bit
proof protocol is a proof of partial knowledge (see Appendix A.1), the adversary has the knowledge of di
and ri for 1 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1. Thereby, given an adversary A that wins the above game with probability ￿, we
can construct a new adversary A0 that not only wins the above game with same probability ￿ but also outputs
d1,...,d`−1,r1,...,r`−1.
Given such attacker A0 that wins the above game with probability ￿, we construct another attacker B that
can solve the CDH problem in Gq, the order-q subgroup of Z∗
p with probability ￿/2. B does the following (all
arithmetic is mod p):
1. B, when given p,q,h ∈ Gq,hx,hy, chooses a positive integer ` such that 2` < q/2 and gives CP =
hp,q,hx,hi and the descriptions of V = [0,2` − 1] and P = {GEa0 | a0 ∈ V} to A0.
2. B receives an integer a ∈ [0,2` − 1] from A0, picks r ← Zq, computes c = (hx)ahr, and sends r and c to
A0.
3. B receives a greater-than-or-equal-to predicate GEa0 from A0 such that GEa0(a) is false. B also receives
c0,c1,...,c`−1,d1,...,d`−1,r1,...,r`−1 from A0 such that di ∈ {0,1} and ci = (hx)dihri for 1 ≤ i ≤
` − 1 and c(hx)−a0 =
Q`−1
i=0(ci)2i
.
4. B sets d0 = a − a0 −
P`−1
i=1 di2i mod q and r0 = r −
P`−1
i=1 ri2i mod q. Observe that c0 =
c(hx)−a0 Q`−1
i=1(ci)−2i
= (hx)a−a0−
P`−1
i=1 di2i
hr−
P`−1
i=1 ri2i
= (hx)d0hr0. Alsoobservethata−a0 mod q 6∈
[0..2`−1] and di ∈ {0,1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1, thus d0 is neither 0 nor 1.
5. B sends hy to A0. B receives σ from A0, computes δ = σh−r0y, and randomly outputs one of δd−1
0 mod q
and δ(d0−1)−1 mod q.
When A0 wins the game, σ = (c0)y or σ = (c0(hx)−1)y. For the ﬁrst case, σ = (c0)y = ((hx)d0hr0)y =
(hxy)d0hr0y, then δ = σh−r0y = (hxy)d0, B outputs δd−1
0 mod q = hxy. For the second case,
σ = (c0(hx)−1)y = ((hx)d0−1hr0)y = (hxy)d0−1hr0y, then δ = σh−r0y = (hxy)d0−1, B outputs
δ(d0−1)−1 mod q = hxy.
B succeeds in solving the CDH problem if and only if A0 wins the above game, i.e., successfully computes
((c0)y mod p) or ((c0g−1)y mod p), and B picks correctly among δd−1
0 mod q and δ(d0−1)−1 mod q.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Consider the game for the oblivious property of OCBE, let us examine what an adversary would see
in the case of GE-OCBE2. The adversary sees a commitment c and ` commitments c0,...,c`−1 such that
cg−a0 =
Q`−1
i=0(ci)2i
mod p. Using the same reasoning in the proof for Theorem 3, c,c0,...,c`−1 together do
not reveal any information about a. Thus GE-OCBE is oblivious even against an inﬁnitely powerful adversary.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Sketch. Because the encryption key k is the XOR of ` random symmetric keys k0,...,k`−1, the adversary
is able to derive the encryption key only if he can compute all these random keys. In order to get ki, the adversary
hastodecrypteitherC0
i orC1
i . AssumeH isarandomoracle, theadversaryhastocomputeeitherσ0
i = c
y
i mod p
or σ1
i = (cig−1)y mod p. Under the DA-1 assumption, the adversary knows the discrete log of either ci or cig−1
for each i. Then the adversary can open cg−a0 with a value d ∈ [0..2` − 1]. Since the adversary can also open
cg−a0 with a − a0, assuming discrete log is hard, a − a0 = d ∈ [0..2` − 1].
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